

# **Strategic Crossroads in the Western Balkans: Croatia's LNG Advantage for the Three Seas, Protecting Croat Interests, and Expanding U.S. Influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Energy Future**

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## **The Three Seas Initiative in Context**

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the Dubrovnik Declaration, when Croatia and Poland launched the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) to strengthen infrastructure connectivity across the European Union (EU) and the transatlantic community.<sup>1</sup> The framework has evolved into a strategic vehicle for enhancing regional security through diversification in trade, technology, and energy across the region spanning the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas. In today's heightened geopolitical climate—shaped by Russia's invasion against Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East—the initiative's emphasis on diversification, resilience, and infrastructure integration has become increasingly urgent amid a major energy crisis.

After hosting the 3SI Summit in Dubrovnik on April 28-29, Croatia is uniquely positioned to help confront the region's pressing security challenges with the rest of Europe and United States. Its Adriatic location, existing liquid natural gas (LNG) infrastructure in the island of Krk, institutional capacity, and maritime gateways that connect Southeastern European energy routes to landlocked markets in Central Europe, and the Western Balkans enable Croatia to strengthen diversification across the broader Three Seas region.

The Western Balkans remains the most exposed neighboring region within the Three Seas region. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is fully dependent on Russian gas via TurkStream through Serbia, and the broader corridor from the Adriatic to Central Europe remains underdeveloped.<sup>2</sup> Without new infrastructure connecting alternative suppliers to these markets, the 3SI's energy pillar will remain incomplete, and Russian leverage over Southeastern Europe will persist. The Southern Gas Interconnection (SGI) pipeline has become a focal point of growing U.S. pressure to accelerate energy diversification in the Western Balkans and European aspirations to decouple from Russian energy by January 2028.<sup>3</sup>

As the United States further requests to integrate Western Balkan countries into the European energy framework, the SGI pipeline project offers a concrete mechanism for advancing these geopolitical objectives. By linking BiH directly to Croatia's LNG system, the project would end BiH's total dependence on Russia's Gazprom and embed the country more firmly in energy corridors aligned with European market rules. To understand what is at stake for the Western Balkans—and why the 3SI's energy-security agenda has become more urgent—it is necessary to recognize the strategic role that Croatia plays in advancing geopolitical efforts of the 3SI to integrate Western Balkan energy projects into European and U.S.-aligned energy markets and reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels.

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1 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia. "Croatia Confirms Commitment to 3SI Goals, Assumes Presidency in 2026." April 11, 2024. <https://mvep.gov.hr/press-22794/croatia-confirms-commitment-to-3si-goals-assumes-presidency-in-2026/272178>.

2 Onyango, Daniel. "U.S. Firms Bid to End Bosnia's Reliance on Russian Gas with New Pipeline." *Pipeline Technology Journal*, January 22, 2026. <https://www.pipeline-journal.net/news/us-firms-bid-end-bosnias-reliance-russian-gas-new-pipelin>.

3 U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo. "Bosnia and Herzegovina's Energy Crossroads: Time to Build the Southern Interconnection." U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, December 5, 2025. <https://ba.usembassy.gov/bosnia-and-herzegovinas-energy-crossroads-time-to-build-the-southern-interconnection/>.

## **Croatia's LNG Capacity**

The island of Krk has emerged as a central pillar of Croatia's evolving LNG role in the Adriatic and its broader contribution to the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). Commissioned in 2021 and expanded after the 2022 energy shock, the floating LNG facility at the port of Omišalj enables imports from the United States and other alternative suppliers, with gas transported onshore through a network of pipelines — including the 18km Omišalj-Zlobin pipeline — connecting the terminal to Croatia's national transmission system and onward to Central and Southeastern Europe.<sup>4</sup> The terminal's annual regasification capacity increased from 3.1 to 6.1 billion cubic meters (bcm), significantly strengthening Croatia's role in regional energy diversification.<sup>5</sup> Since operations began on January 2021, the facility has received more than 100 LNG cargoes from suppliers including the United States, effectively eliminating Croatia's dependence on Russian gas imports.<sup>6</sup> Overall, at least 68% of LNG terminal imports have come from the United States making it largest energy importer to Krk.<sup>7</sup>

For Croatia's Three Seas partners, Krk provides a non-Russian entry point for gas into a region that has long depended on price manipulation influenced by Moscow. Croatia now has the capacity to supply neighboring markets such as Hungary and Slovenia. As Croatia's economy minister, Ante Šušnjar, emphasized, "Croatia is a key part of the solution for European energy security and will continue to actively strengthen stable and reliable energy routes across both Central and Southeastern Europe."<sup>8</sup> Croatia's ability to fully leverage this capacity with Hungary, however, has been constrained by transit-fee disputes and interconnection limitations along the Adria Pipeline, compounded by former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's longstanding support for strengthening relations with Moscow. However, the recent election victory of Prime Minister Péter Magyar, who has pledged to wean Hungary away from Russian energy, could have positive implications for Croatia to expand its LNG diversification and trade into Central Europe.

The Croatian Island of Krk hosts the only operational LNG terminal on the eastern Adriatic, receiving gas shipments from the United States and other allied suppliers. Croatia's anticipated accession to the OECD would further reinforce its reputation among Western investors as a stable, rules-based environment for large-scale infrastructure investment. Together, the Adriatic coastline, the Krk LNG terminal, and pipeline projects such as the Southern Gas Interconnection (SGI) and the planned Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) position Croatia as a regional transit hub capable of reshaping gas flows from the Western Balkans into Central and Eastern Europe.

Croatia's ability to convert LNG capacity into sustained regional influence depends on extending its infrastructure southward, most importantly to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), which anticipates connecting its SGI pipeline networks with the Croatia coast. Krk's entry point provides a strategic and economic advantage by expanding access to non-Russian LNG and linking BiH to Croatia via the SGI

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<sup>4</sup> Skočajić, Silvana. "Zbog plinske krize Vlada povećava kapacitet LNG terminala na Krku." HRT Vijesti, August 18, 2022. <https://vijesti.hrt.hr/gospodarstvo/zbog-plinske-krize-vlada-povecava-kapacitet-lng-terminala-na-krku-9085999>.

<sup>5</sup> CEE Energy News. "The New Module at Croatia's Krk LNG Terminal Is Operating in Test Mode." November 4, 2025. <https://ceenergynews.com/oil-gas/croatia-krk-lng-module-test-mode/>.

<sup>6</sup> Croatia Week. "Croatia Ensures Stable Gas Supply Amid Russian Transit Disruption." January 3, 2025. <https://www.croatiaweek.com/croatia-ensures-stable-gas-supply-amid-russian-transit-disruption/>.

<sup>7</sup> Croatia Week. "Croatia Ensures Stable Gas Supply Amid Russian Transit Disruption." January 3, 2025. <https://www.croatiaweek.com/croatia-ensures-stable-gas-supply-amid-russian-transit-disruption/>.

<sup>8</sup> Simmonds, Lauren. "Croatia Is Part of the Solution to European Energy Security." *Total Croatia News*, February 26, 2026. <https://total-croatia-news.com/news/croatia-european-energy/>.

pipeline, extending alternatives through broader regional networks toward EU markets. While the objective is to strengthen energy resilience and reduce the Balkans' reliance on Russian Gazprom gas and oil, domestic political challenges—and the opportunities they create within Federation of BiH—will shape further engagement, either incorporate Croat participation or sideline their interests.

### **The SGI Pipeline**

The Western Balkans remains a deeply contested region where energy diversification intersects with geopolitical competition. BiH is one of primary Western Balkans countries at the heart of the power competition while it struggles with interethnic distrust, institutional stagnation, complex government systems, and malign influence from Russia, China, and Iran. These persisting dynamics complicate efforts by the EU and NATO to promote stability and European integration.

Structured under the framework by the Dayton Peace Accords signed in 1995, the country is organized into two entities- the Federation of BiH (shared by Croats and Bosniaks) and Republika Srpska (run by Serbs)- creating a complex governance system that complicates long-term infrastructure development. Republika Srpska leadership under Milorad Dodik has consistently supported continued cooperation with Russian energy providers, reinforcing BiH's fragmentation and complicating diversification efforts.

At present, BiH remains fully dependent on Russian gas via TurkStream, which enters from Serbia to Zvornik in Republika Srpska. BiH currently imports roughly 230–250 million cubic meters of natural gas per year, a single-route model that exposes the country to supply disruptions and reinforces Russian political leverage.<sup>9</sup> Although natural gas accounts for roughly 8% of BiH's total energy consumption for domestic heating, its concentration in urban and industrial centers—particularly Sarajevo—makes diversification strategically significant.<sup>10</sup>

If completed, the 236 km pipeline (74 km in Croatia and 162 km in BiH) will connect it from the existing Zvornik-Sarajevo pipeline to a newly construct pipeline from BiH towns in Travnik to Posušje to networks in Mostar and cross broader with the Split-Dalmatian towns of Imotski and Zagvozd where it will link with the island of Krk's LNG terminal. The planned Krk-BiH pipeline connection could import U.S. LNG with a capacity of 1.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) and strategically expand regional diversification in both the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska.<sup>11</sup>

Although the EU classifies the SGI as a transitional project under the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans—and broader climate objectives to phase down fossil fuels—the SGI serves as an energy-security necessity. It diversifies supply and helps reduce Russia's monopoly power in European gas markets, limiting the revenues that finance Moscow's war in Ukraine and support its broader partnerships with Iran and China.

For Croats in BiH, the SGI carries significant strategic importance. The route passes through cantons with substantial Croat populations, including areas around Mostar and north toward Novi Travnik, and would connect effectively with Croatian pipeline networks extending to border towns in Split-Dalmatia County.

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<sup>9</sup> Kurasinska, Lidia. "Bosnia Moves Ahead with New Pipeline to Reduce Dependence on Russian Gas." *Forbes*, January 26, 2025. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/lidiakurasinska/2025/01/26/bosnia-moves-ahead-with-new-pipeline-to-reduce-dependence-on-russian-gas/>.

<sup>10</sup> Sito-Sucic, Daria. "Bosnia Selects US Investor for Gas Link with Croatia to Cut Reliance on Russia." *Reuters*, April 15, 2026. <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/bosnia-selects-us-investor-gas-link-with-croatia-cut-reliance-russia-2026-04-15/>.

<sup>11</sup> Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF). "Bosnia and Herzegovina – Croatia South Gas Interconnection." PRJ-BIH-ENE-009. <https://www.wbif.eu/project-detail/PRJ-BIH-ENE-009>.

Although the infrastructure would integrate Mostar's industrial and urban systems more closely with Croatia, the Federation's governance structure has limited BiH Croats' ability to participate as institutional partners, often relegating them to passive beneficiaries of decisions made in Sarajevo.

The political stalemates in the Federation parliament that delayed the project stem from broader instability in governance in the Federation parliament. The civic majoritarian political dynamics and competing visions of a centralized state-run gas company have, at times, limited the ability of smaller constituent communities—particularly BiH Croats—to shape energy and economic policy. These tensions are further complicated by international actors whose interventions, while often intended to preserve institutional stability, also affect domestic political arrangements and can reinforce existing governance disputes.

In mid-2025, the Federation's adoption of SGI legislation followed nearly four years of political delay and sustained diplomatic engagement by both the EU and United States. U.S. State Department officials, including Ambassador Michael Murphy, publicly urged Federation leaders to break the legislative deadlock, warning that the continued holdup could undermine investor confidence and jeopardize millions in pledged support for the project.<sup>12</sup> This action led to the adoption of the SGI law to designate BH-Gas, a Sarajevo-based, state-owned operator, as the sole entity responsible for planning, permitting, construction, and future management of the pipeline.

Legislative approval, however, did not resolve underlying governance disputes. Bosniak-led parties—including the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the governing Troika coalition (SDP, NiP, and Naša Stranka)—supported BH-Gas's Sarajevo-centered role, passing the measure without Croat support and exacerbating tensions.<sup>13</sup> Dragan Čović, President of the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH), who opposed exclusive of Sarajevo control over the pipeline, expanded the plan that would create a three-way ownership agreement with a Croatian segment to oversee the Croatian network of the SGI pipeline coming from Split and Zagvozd (Croatia) to Posušje, Tomislavgrad, and Travnik (BiH).<sup>14</sup> This agreement reflected the geopolitical realities on the Croatian side of the pipeline – through which LNG from Krk would flow into the Federation of BiH - and established a concession framework that both secures gas diversification and protects BiH Croat interests with the role of the Federation of BiH's energy institutions.

Designating BH-Gas as the sole implementing authority for the project limited opportunities to revise governance in ways that would ensure Croat institutional participation. In December 2025, Federation President Lidija Bradara filed a constitutional appeal challenging the procedural validity of the SGI law's adoption. Although the ruling did not reject the pipeline project as such, it underscored the voting for the SGI legislation as unconstitutional and did not fall into Croat interests addressed in the three-way ownership agreement. Bradara's ruling - and its recent withdrawal - has taken on a new dimension with the arrival of President Donald Trump and his administration's push to accelerate implementation of the project along with Konaković welcoming U.S. involvement. Their proposal to grant operational

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<sup>12</sup> Murphy, Michael. "Ambassador Murphy's Speech at 2024 BiH Energy Summit." U.S. Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, April 24, 2024. <https://ba.usembassy.gov/ambassador-murphys-speech-at-2024-bih-energy-summit/>.

<sup>13</sup> "Identity Politics Is Holding Up Balkan Energy Development." *The National Interest*, January 21, 2025. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/identity-politics-holding-balkan-energy-development-214186>.

<sup>14</sup> [Croatia and Bosnia Sign Landmark Deal for Southern Interconnection Pipeline | Pipeline Technology Journal](#)

concessions to an American company introduces a shift that could change the project's direction at both the domestic and political level and alter BH Gas' role in the current legislation.<sup>15</sup>

### **American Engagement, Private Capital and the Question of Local Capacity**

The United States has long served as Croatia's most important strategic ally, and American diplomatic engagement has been instrumental in advancing the SGI pipeline. U.S. Chargé d'Affaires John Ginkel met a series of meetings with political leaders in the Federation of BiH, including Croat representatives from HDZ BiH and HDZ 1990, as well as members of the governing Troika coalition. These discussions aimed to break the legislative and procedural deadlock that had stalled implementation despite formal passage of the SGI law.<sup>16</sup> The introduction of American gas through Krk island- a current major component of LNG cargoes arriving at the terminal - aligns the SGI with broader U.S. energy diplomacy designed to reduce Russian influence across Europe.

During these engagements, U.S. officials introduced the possibility of involving a private American company to help lead development, construction, and long-term operation of the SGI pipeline lasting 30–50 years. The proposal was framed as a mechanism to overcome domestic political stalemate by transferring execution to an external commercial actor capable of providing technical ability and financing credibility. BiH Foreign Minister Elmedin Konaković publicly supported accelerated implementation under such a framework, while pushing back calls from Dragan Čović for Mostar-based companies to oversee public-sector cooperation between Croatia and BiH.

The American energy company, AAFS Infrastructure and Energy — formed by associates of the Trump administration, Joseph Flynn and Jesse Binnall — submitted a letter of intent to the Federation parliament to obtain a concession to develop and manage infrastructure planning for the SGI project. Bechtel, a major American energy construction company, with a significant footprint in the Western Balkans, has expressed interest in serving as a potential construction contractor; however, it holds no formal role in AAFS project discussions.<sup>17</sup> Representatives of AAFS participated in discussions with U.S. Embassy and Federation officials, aligning their proposal with broader administration commitments to energy diversification and reduced Russian influence in the Western Balkans. These project discussions with government officials and AAFS have included an interest in the expansion of the Kladanj-Tuzla pipeline, along with three proposed 400-megawatt gas-fired power plants in Mostar, Tuzla, and Kakanj, airport upgrades in Sarajevo and Mostar, and continued development of Corridor Vc.

### **Federation Approval for the U.S. Private Company and Need for Transparency**

During a press conference on April 1, Federation Energy Minister Vedran Lakić appeared with AAFS leaders to present the project as a U.S.-backed strategic investment, with AAFS owners Joseph Flynn and Jesse Binnall claiming AAFS would be the foreign-funded investor while Energoinvest will continue

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<sup>15</sup> Sarajevo Times. "Constitutional Court Decision: Southern Interconnection Compliant with the Constitution of FBiH." March 13, 2026. <https://sarajevotimes.com/constitutional-court-decision-southern-interconnection-compliant-with-the-constitution-of-fbih/>.

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo. "Bosnia and Herzegovina's Energy Crossroads: Time to Build the Southern Interconnection." December 5, 2025. <https://ba.usembassy.gov/bosnia-and-herzegovinas-energy-crossroads-time-to-build-the-southern-interconnection/>.

<sup>17</sup> Istraga. "Predložen nacrt izmjena zakona o južnoj interkonekciji: BH Gas izbačen, nositelj projekta biće američka kompanija AAFS sa sjedištem u Sarajevu." March 2026. <https://istraga.ba/predlozen-nacrt-izmjena-zakona-o-juznoj-interkonekciji-bh-gas-izbacen-nositelj-projekta-bice-americka-kompanija-aafs-sa-sjedistem-u-sarajevu/>.

importing gas. Sarajevo director Amer Bekan is part of the AAFS leadership and has been central to political outreach as the amended law moves toward parliamentary consideration.

After weeks of debating, on April 15, BiH lower and upper parliament eventually approved the SGI law legislation to concede AAFS's contract to be managing operator and investor for the project and removed BH Gas from the law.<sup>18</sup> The total internal investment package for the project will cost 1.5 billion convertible marks (KM)<sup>19</sup> or \$893 million which includes a bundle of profitable investment components that will include the pipeline 216 million KM, gas power plants infrastructure, and 300 million KM for modernization of airports in Sarajevo and Mostar.

Critics have remained skeptical regarding AAFS's institutional capacity and prior experience managing large-scale energy infrastructure projects, given its recent formation only in Wyoming in November 2025. Additional scrutiny surrounds Amer Bekan, CEO of the Prague-based Karimpol Group, who attended high-level SGI discussions and was a prominent voice in addressing AAFS funding for the project as an investor package to attract other gas companies. Although not formally affiliated with AAFS, Bekan previously registered a Sarajevo-based company under the same AAFS name in 2021 for wholesale fuel operations. This overlap raises questions about ownership structures, investor transparency in capital, and the network of actors involved in project development. Underlying the legislative disputes, the SGI faces deeper obstacles. The pipeline route passes through territory whose ownership remains contested between competing levels of government, a legacy of the Dayton Agreement's unresolved property questions.

Beyond questions of capacity, the proposed concession model raises broader political and economic concerns for BiH Croats if Bechtel is approved to be selected as a construction contractor. Previous Bechtel-led infrastructure projects in the Western Balkans — often conducted with its Turkish partner ENKA — have drawn criticism over cost inflation, limited competitive bidding, and insufficient inclusion of domestic contractors.<sup>20</sup> Should a similar arrangement take shape for the Southern Interconnection, concentrating project authority among foreign developers and Sarajevo-based institutions, it could limit Croat participation in a pipeline that physically traverses cantons with significant Croat populations. A concession model transferring operational control of BiH's gas infrastructure to foreign firms for several decades — without guarantees for Croat participation in construction, management, and labor — risks substituting one form of external dependency for another, potentially marginalizing Mostar-based companies and weakening Croat institutional influence over long-term energy governance.

Welcoming a private U.S. company as operator could help BiH decouple itself from Russian gas, but the concession framework must guarantee transparency, constituent participation, open access to infrastructure, and competition consistent with EU energy market rules. If applied appropriately to the standards with the EU, this U.S. framework could set the conditions for the project's next phase of regional integration with the rest of the Southeastern and Central Europe and support BiH's EU accession trajectory.

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<sup>18</sup> [Bosnia selects US investor for gas link with Croatia to cut reliance on Russia | Reuters](#)

<sup>19</sup> The currency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

<sup>20</sup> [Bechtel Bespoke: US Engineering Giant's Modus Operandi in the Balkans Causes Concern | Balkan Insight](#)

## **Regional Integration and the Next Phase of the SGI**

The Southern Gas Interconnection does not exist solely in BiH. It connects to the broader Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), which transports Azerbaijani gas from the Caspian Sea to Southeast Europe through the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The planned Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline (IAP), linking Albania, Montenegro, BiH, and Croatia, would further extend this network northward along the Adriatic.<sup>21</sup> If completed, the SGI would enable BiH to access gas from both Adriatic LNG imports and Caspian sources, creating supply redundancy that reduces single-supplier vulnerability.

This emerging network also intersects with Central European markets. Hungary's deep reliance on Russian gas under Viktor Orbán long constrained regional energy diversification, but the April 2026 election of Prime Minister Péter Magyar — who has pledged to wean Hungary off Russian energy by 2035 — could open new opportunities for Croatia to expand its LNG trade northward. Rather than facilitating continued Russian transit dependence, Croatia has prioritized infrastructure that supports diversification and aligns with broader European Union and U.S. energy security objectives. In this context, the SGI represents not only a diversification mechanism for BiH, but also part of a broader north-south energy corridor linking Adriatic LNG and Caspian gas supplies to Central European markets.

Together, these developments would consolidate Croatia's role as the Adriatic anchor of the Three Seas Initiative energy architecture, combining Krk's expanded capacity, JANAF infrastructure, and regional interconnectors to position Croatia as a critical transit state linking Western Balkan energy markets to European supply networks.

## **Conclusion**

As the 3SI Summit in Dubrovnik approaches, Croatia is positioned to advance a critical energy project that could strengthen energy security in Central and Eastern Europe with its expected intergovernmental agreement with BiH to advance the implementation of the SGI project that connects with the LNG Terminal in Krk. The SGI is entering a decisive phase in which progress will depend not only on infrastructure, but also on a legal framework model for future energy projects that reflect the institutional, legal, and developmental realities of a sovereign nation. For the project to advance sustainably, the Federation must enforce its three-constituent Dayton framework in a way that fully incorporates BiH Croat participation in legal, management, construction, and long-term operations in key BiH regional areas, like Mostar, Tomislavgrad, and Novi Travnik.

The new legislation that introduces AAFS as operator, investor, and contractor will need to provide provisions by the Council Ministers for BiH Croat participation in the project's governance.<sup>22</sup> At minimum, this should include meaningful three-way participation framework that ensure Mostar-based companies in construction and operations, to protect BiH Croat interests for a project that physically traverses their territory, and oversight mechanisms rooted in Mostar rather than exclusively in Sarajevo. Croatia's role will be decisive: leveraging its geographic position, the Krk LNG terminal, and alignment with European and American partners, Croatia can help anchor a coherent cross-border framework that ties the SGI to regional diversification efforts and reinforces non-Russian supply routes across the Western Balkans.

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<sup>21</sup> [Project details](#)

<sup>22</sup> [President of the Federation signs Decree on Entry into Force of the Southern Interconnection Act - Sarajevo Times](#)

The official signing between Croatia and BiH during the Dubrovnik Summit for the intergovernmental agreement on the construction of the SGI pipeline has officially determined the willingness of both countries to expand diversification of natural gas and enable energy freedom at time of urgency for the Western Balkans and for Europe. However, AAFS's capability as main operator and investor must translate political backing into financing, construction momentum, and operational progress between BiH and Croatia. Success will hinge on AAFS's ability to mobilize investment, structure practical concession terms, and adopt inclusive governance practices that reflect the country's three constituent peoples and preserve BiH's internal political balance.

The resulting agreement, together with finalized consultations at the Council of Ministers level, will also determine whether Croat institutional participation is incorporated or excluded into the project's management structure. If these elements align, the SGI can emerge not only as a strategic energy asset for BiH, but also as a catalyst for investment, stronger regional connectivity, and deeper integration with Croatia's geopolitical position into an increasingly interconnected European energy market and advance EU and Western Balkan integration. AAFS and Federation officials must ensure that Croat interests are protected through a similar structure parallel to the three-way framework and support the broader transatlantic strategy goals for the U.S. to support Croatia's advancement in the OECD and forward the Administration's diversification goals to integrate BiH with the three-seas region.